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Lift your lamp beside the golden door, Break not the golden rule, avoid well the golden calf, know; not all that glitters is gold, and laissez faire et laissez passer [let do and let pass] but as a shining sentinel, hesitate not to ring the bell, defend the gates, and man the wall

Tell Me What Democracy Looks Like!

Tell Me What Democracy Looks Like! THIS IS WHAT DEMOCRACY LOOKS LIKE!!!

Cycle of Democracies

overview of what various forms of Govt.

Sunday, October 17, 2010


The Long Depression, The Depression of 1920, The Great Depression, and The Great Recession 
The Long Depression
The Original "Great Depression" 1873-1896 
History of Money and Banking in the United States by Murray Rothbard [free PDF ebook]
[This refers solely to America]
pg 154
Orthodox economic historians have long complained about the “great depression” that is supposed to have struck the United States in the panic of 1873 and lasted for an unprecedented six years, until 1879. Much of this stagnation is supposed to have been caused by a monetary contraction leading to the resumption of specie payments in 1879. Yet what sort of “depression” is it which saw an extraordinarily large expansion of industry, of railroads, of physical output, of net national product, or real per capita income? As Friedman and Schwartz admit, the decade from 1869 to 1879 saw a 3-percent-perannum increase in money national product, an outstanding real national product growth of 6.8 percent per year in this period, and a phenomenal rise of 4.5 percent per year in real product per capita. Even the alleged “monetary contraction” never took place, the money supply increasing by 2.7 percent per year in this period. From 1873 through 1878, before another spurt of monetary expansion, the total supply of bank money rose from $1.964 billion to $2.221 billion—a rise of 13.1 percent or 2.6 percent per year. In short, a modest but definite rise, and scarcely a contraction. It should be clear, then, that the “great depression” of the 1870s is merely a myth—a myth brought about by misinterpretation of the fact that prices in general fell sharply during the entire period. Indeed they fell from the end of the Civil War until 1879. Friedman and Schwartz estimated that prices in general fell from 1869 to 1879 by 3.8 percent per annum. Unfortunately, most historians and economists are conditioned to believe that steadily and sharply falling prices must result in depression: hence their amazement at the obvious prosperity and economic growth during this era. For they have overlooked the fact that in the natural course of events, when government and the banking system do not increase the money supply very rapidly, freemarket capitalism will result in an increase of production and economic growth so great as to swamp the increase of money supply. Prices will fall, and the consequences will be not depression or stagnation, but prosperity (since costs are falling, too) economic growth, and the spread of the increased living standard to all the consumers.


The Depression of 1920

The Great Depression

Great Depression Playlist


The Forgotton Man by Amity Shlaes [Excerpts Thereof]

Title Page, The Forgotten Man Essay by William Graham Sumner
pg 1, Introduction: William Troeller, just one story, in a city of troubled stories.
pg 99-100, Herbert Hoover, Richard Whitney, and Short Selling, an essential gamble


The Global Impact of the Great Depression, 1929-1939 by Dietmar Rothermund [Google Books.com]

The depression was transmitted from America to Europe in 1930. The stock market crash of October 1929 did not have an immediate effect on Europe. On the contrary, financial circles could heave a sigh of relief as they were no longer threatened by the rush of funds to New York. Discount rates which had been raised to counteract that flow could be lowered once more and this eased the strain on European financial markets. From 1925 to the beginning of 1929 the discount rate of the Bank of England had stood at about 4.5 per cent. By September 1929 it had been raised to 6.5 per cent. Immediately after the crash it was reduced to 6 per cent. It was then lowered bit by bit until it stood at 2.5 per cent in May 1931. In France a new generous programme of state expenditure was announced only a few weeks after the crash. But this was not done in wise anticipation of the impending crisis, but only because France had consolidated its currency and was in a very comfortable financial position. It could afford such a programme now, and nobody thought of a crisis.
Germany faced an impending bankruptcy at that time which was entirely unrelated to the events in America. The German government was under political pressure to cut taxes, but on the other hand it could no longer place long term government bonds and thus depended on short term credit. In this context the lowering of the discount rate after the crash was very welcome to the government. In subsequent years Germany faced a crisis of a special kind which will be analysed in the respective section of this chapter. At this stage these statements may suffice to show that the crash of 1929 did not mark the beginning of the depression in Europe. The mechanism of the transmission of the depression was much more complex. Europe was affected only after a considerable... [continued on page 60] -
time lag. In order to reconstruct the process of transmission we shall present four case studies: Great Britain, Germany, France and Sweden, the latter so as to illustrate a very special instance of successful crisis management.
Henry Morgenthau, Jr. [Wikipedia]
FDR's Treasury Secretary

"We have tried spending money. We are spending more than we have ever spent before and it does not work. And I have just one interest, and if I am wrong … somebody else can have my job. I want to see this country prosperous. I want to see people get a job. I want to see people get enough to eat. We have never made good on our promises. … I say after eight years of this Administration we have just as much unemployment as when we started. … And an enormous debt to boot."
The Great Recession

Liberty and Tyranny by Mark R. Levin Excerpts 

   A. What belongs to no one is wasted by everyone
   B. Statist's rationalizing Loophole around property rights
       "The Public Good"
Four Events that led to the Housing Bust of '08 
   EVENT 1: The CRA of 1977

EVENT 2: HUD pressures Govt Chartered Freddie and Fannie to encourage risky loans
   EVENT 3: Govt Intervention/Social Engineering produces the "Derivative"/Speculation Market 
   EVENT 4: The Federal Reserve slashes interest rates from 2001's at 6.5% to 2006's at 1%


The Scope of the Bailout/Stimulus




The Inflationist View of History -http://mises.org/daily/4143 
After having skimmed these sources to respond to a comment; now I actually need to do my homework; which is to organize this into comprehensive knowledge for reference [IE my own memory trigger/vault]









Fannie, Freddie, and the Subprime Mortgage Market


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